Can We Win Over The Taliban in Afghanistan?
There are two fundamental ways to win over an enemy: through the use of carrots or sticks. When President Obama committed 30,000 troops to meet General McChrystal’s request, he chose the path of increased force against the Taliban. Yet, in mid-January, the Karzai administration proposed a major new reconciliation effort to offer jobs, security, education and other social benefits to Taliban followers who defect. This program, discussed with United States special envoy Richard Holbrooke, would move in tandem with the build-up of the American Marines and soldiers.
President Hamid Karzai had previously promised amnesty to Taliban fighters who would give up their weapons, and has offered to talk with their leader, Mullah Omar, but with very little success.
It is estimated by the United Nations that only 170 Taliban accepted the amnesty offer by late 2009. The new plan would include strong guarantees against arrest or retaliation although it would not guarantee integration into local police forces – a carrot with some appeal to former lower-level and mid-level Taliban fighters. A controversial part of the new proposal may be that Mullah Omar be removed from the United Nations’ terrorist blacklist that prohibits international travel and freezes bank assets. Richard Holbrooke, when asked about this possibility, said, “I can’t imagine what would justify such an action.”
The Taliban responded to Karzai on January l8, the day he was swearing in his new Cabinet ministers. They launched a massive coordinated attack of suicide bombings and teams of fighters in the center of the capital city of Kabul, aimed at the presidential palace, government ministries, the central bank, and the huge Froshga Market. Militants battled police and Afghan security forces in the streets while helicopters whirled overhead. It took three hours to restore security to the city, and the death, destruction and chaos had sent a clear message from the Taliban leaders to President Karzai. They were not interested in reconciliation.
The Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan have the same name, but they differ in origin, goals and current status. The Afghanistan Taliban was founded by Mullah Muhammad Omar in l994 in Kandahar province. They held power over most of the country and hosted Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda until being driven out by the American invasion of 2001. Their goal is to overthrow the Karzai government, oust foreign forces and establish an Islamist state. The leadership council, or shura, is headed by Mullah Omar who is believed to be hiding near Quetta, Pakistan. Most Taliban are from the Pashtun tribes, linked by ethnicity and language. The Taliban already have shadow governments in many of the provinces.
The Pakistani Taliban, founded in 2007, is also made up of mostly Pashtun tribes that share the radical Islamist ideology with the Afghan group. A looser coalition than in Afghanistan, their goal, however, is singular – to overthrow the government of Pakistan. Originally, they were led by Baitullah Mehsud, but he was killed by an American missile in August. The new leader is Hakimullah Mehsud. They have launched attacks by suicide bombers against the government in advance of the current Pakistani Army campaign against them in South Waziristan. Complicating the political picture is the presence of Al Qaeda, believed to be based in the mountainous areas in Pakistan. Founded by Osama bin Laden in l988, Al Qaeda continues to preach global jihad and attacks on Europe and the United States.
The Taliban in Afghanistan are funded with millions of dollars from three main sources: opium, foreign donations and extortion. Afghanistan supplies more than 90 percent of the world’s heroin, and the illicit drug trade makes up about half of the country’s economy. This past summer, the United States reversed its failed policy of destroying the poppy fields by spraying or plowing them under. Instead the focus turned to intercepting the drug runners and the drug lords. The Taliban have created an elaborate system of taxing the growing, processing and shipment of opium: farmers pay a ten percent tax to Taliban commanders and fighters can make money harvesting poppies in the fields; traders who collect opium paste from farmers to take to labs where it is turned into heroin are taxed; Taliban are also paid to protect the labs; truckers on the road pay the Taliban a transit fee on opium paste or heroin; and at the top, drug trafficking organizations make large regular payments to the Quetta Shura, the Taliban’s governing council.
The second major financial source is from donors sympathetic to the ideology and aims of the Taliban. The CIA estimated in October of 2009 that Taliban leaders had received $106 million from people outside the country. Private citizens from Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Iran and other Persian Gulf nations are the largest individual contributors. The third source of money is from kidnappings and extortion payments. Estimates of the total Taliban annual income vary widely with the greatest emphasis on proceeds from the opium trade. According to the United Nations and the Pentagon, opium alone can bring in from $70 million to $400 million a year. General McChrystal, in his August strategic assessment, addressed the entire issue when he said, “Eliminating access to narcoprofits – even if possible and while disruptive -would not destroy their ability to operate so long as other funding sources remain intact.”
In a dramatic breakthrough at the end of January, 50 leaders of one of the largest Pashtun tribes, the Shinwari, met at Jalalabad in southeastern Afghanistan. The elders, representing about 400,000 people, declared that the entire tribe would oppose the Taliban. “The shura proclaims that the Shinwari tribe stands unified against all insurgent groups, specifically the Taliban.” They agreed to support the American backed Karzai government and set harsh penalties against Taliban sympathizers. “The shura authorizes the burning of residences of those found harboring the Taliban.” the proclamation said. American commanders agreed to give $1million in development projects to the tribal leaders. There is a long history of enmity and tension between the Shinwari tribe and the Taliban. One of the elders, Malik Niaz, said, “The Taliban have been trying to destroy our tribe, and they are taking money from us, and they are taking our sons to fight. If they defy us now, we will defeat them.’
At the same time that the Shinwari challenge to the Taliban unfolded southeast of Kabul, President Karzai was in London at a 65-nation conference on Afghanistan, seeking backing for his overall plan of reconciliation with the Taliban and the finances to put it into effect. He announced that he would invite Taliban leaders to a tribal assembly in the coming weeks, which came as a surprise to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and others who have deep concerns about negotiating with Taliban leaders who sheltered Osama bin Laden and maintain ties to Al Qaeda. The conference raised $140 million to ease the reintegration of Taliban fighters, with $500 million pledged in all. The United States was not included since the Treasury Department would have to approve such financing to the Taliban, classified as a terrorist organization.
The carrots and sticks contrast continue to limn the outlines of the Afghanistan War. The reality is on the ground as U.S. Marines search for homemade bombs and withstand ambush attacks in Helmand and Kandahar Provinces, southeastern Taliban strongholds.
Joyce S. Anderson is the author of “Courage in High Heels,” “Flaw in the Tapestry,” “If Winter Comes” and “The Mermaids Singing.” She can be reached at JSAWrite@aol.com.








