The Next Gaza War

Operation Cast Lead, Israel’s last war in Gaza, recently had its first anniversary. The war was a mixed bag for both Israelis and Gazans. The Palestinians living in Gaza, except for the Hamas bigwigs, are far worse off than before Cast Lead: there were more than a thousand dead and many more casualties; there was massive destruction of infrastructure, housing, and factories; Gaza’s borders are all but closed by both Israel and Egypt except for food and medicine; and the Palestinian population of Gaza is being increasingly constrained by its Taliban-like rulers.

In past years, and especially after Israel pulled out of Gaza in 2006, thousands of projectiles were fired into Sderot and other communities in the western Negev. Israel, by its devastating Cast Lead campaign, all but stopped rocket attacks on its territory. There were a very small number of Israeli casualties, with some deaths caused by friendly fire. The greatest damage to Israel has come from political and diplomatic censure of Israel’s actions to defend itself. Leftists, governments from many Western countries, the United Nations, and the entire Third World continue to castigate Israel for responding to eight years of unrelenting rocket attacks. The propaganda blaming Israel for winning hasn’t abated in the last year; it has increased.

Hamas didn’t sit on its hands after being hammered last year. In fact, they acted as if they had defeated Israel, by dint of the fact that their movement hadn’t been utterly destroyed. Iran quickly set about rearming Gaza via the hundreds of tunnels that originate across the Egyptian border in Sinai. The smuggling operations have proved so successful that, despite its closed borders, there are now tens of thousands more rockets and other sophisticated armaments in Gaza than before Cast Lead. Besides materiel, foreign terrorists have been smuggled in, especially Hizbullah fighters from Lebanon, who are also supported by Iran. These

infiltrators have joined Hamas and the other, smaller terrorist groups in Gaza.

Two of Israel’s stated war aims, to eradicate Hamas and free kidnapped Jewish soldier Gilad Schalit, weren’t accomplished in last year ’s w a r. But recently, things haven’t gone so well for Hamas and Iran. Up to now, Hamas has inexplicably been able to “hide” the fact that Gaza has a border with Egypt, the Philadelphi route. Nevertheless, the blame for Gaza’s isolation has been heaped solely on Israel. Now that Egypt has belatedly realized the danger to itself of a jihadist enclave in Gaza, it has joined Israel’s siege against the Hamas stronghold in earnest. Egypt will no longer allow so-called aid missions from Europe or America to cross into Gaza. It is also building a huge, 100- foot steel wall (most of it below ground), along the Philadelphi route to inhibit tunnel construction. If the smuggling is stopped, the terrorists’ lifeline to armaments will be cut and the Gazans’ access to consumer goods will likewise end. In that event, the ordinary Palestinians –- those who haven’t been molded into Islamist cannon fodder – may well revolt.

In addition, the negotiations to swap Gilad Schalit for hundreds of Palestinian prisoners are not going well. The patience of the prisoners’ families may be running out, especially since Schalit’s release is being held up by Hamas leaders in Damascus. Lately, smaller terror groups (not Hamas) have increased rocket attacks against Israel, which Hamas could prevent if it wished. Hamas may be allowing the upsurge in terror to invite Israeli retaliation, thereby inciting the Gazans to redirect their percolating dissatisfaction with the heavyhanded rule of Hamas towards the Jews. After all, brutalizing their own people to promote long-term goals has long been Palestinian policy.

As for Iran, it seems that lately its nuclear weapons efforts have been bogged down while internal unrest is continuing. Instead of being seen as the inevitable wave of the future for Muslims who wish for an international Caliphate (Islamic world government), Iran is beginning to look like a loser country run by a clown. Increasing violence against Israel, and perhaps also against world Jewry (a specialty of Hizbullah, an Iranian proxy), may be employed as a diversion from Iran’s waning popularity.

If renewed hostilities with Israel escalate, an even bigger war than Operation Cast Lead may result.There has been conjecture that Israel may respond against its neighboring enemies by trying to better the record it set in the Six Day War, when Israel soundly defeated its adversaries in a lightning campaign. Because Israel has seen that it will be vilified by the majority of world opinion for defending itself, preemptively or reflexively, its best tactic may be to mount an overwhelming, massive campaign on several fronts. Yes, world condemnation will follow, but no more than if Israel fights a longer, less conclusive battle, as it did in what may eventually be called the “First Iranian War” (the Second Lebanon War of 2007) and the “Second Iranian War” (Operation Cast Lead).

The improved and more numerous weapons of Hamas, and especially those of Hizbullah, can reach all of Israel, though Israel will soon deploy the Iron Dome anti-missile system, which will defend against short-range rocket attacks. Israel already has capabilities against medium and long-range missiles. In addition, the Israeli government has unveiled plans to build a sophisticated border fence along its lengthy border with Egypt. In addition to blocking smugglers and would-be refugees, the barrier will prevent Gazan terrorists from sneaking into Israel after entering Egypt.

Operation Cast Lead hopefully showed Israel’s leaders that absorbing punishment - for eight years! – in the hope of gaining world sympathy is counterproductive, at the very least. While the “useful idiots” condemn Israel for defending itself, they don’t seem to realize that they are condoning an incompetent policy that prevents democracies from defending against terrorist campaigns. The Islamist leaders may think the false conception of “disproportional warfare” will be their shield against Israeli attacks, but that misconception will not prevent massive retaliation if Hamas goes too far.

Stephen Kramer resided and worked in the Atlantic City area until 1991, when he moved to Israel with his wife, Michal Langweiler, and two sons. He can be reached at Sjk1@jhu.edu.